Once again trial by jury is coming under scrutiny.
Boris Johnson had promised a Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. It was never established. The former Justice Secretary Dominic Raab introduced a much mocked “Bill of Rights Bill” which contained an odd clause declaring that trial by jury was a right, except when it wasn’t. Mr Raab was sacked, his Bill was dropped and the appetite for legislation about criminal procedure faded.
However, times have changed. Against the background of a shrinking economy and a growing backlog of Crown Court cases Lord Leveson has been asked to conduct an “Independent Review of Criminal Courts.”
And this time, it seems, the government is likely to do something significant. It has juries in its sights.
Leveson is not coming to the review cold. Ten years ago his “Review of Efficiency in the Criminal Courts” made numerous recommendations, most of which were implemented. In that review Leveson hinted very strongly that he favoured far more radical changes, and in particular the abolition of the right to trial by jury in either way offences:
“It is” wrote Leveson in 2015, “of course implicit in a scheme of ‘either-way’ offences that – depending on the seriousness and other circumstances of the case – some cases simply do not merit the more elaborate, costly and time-consuming procedures of the Crown Court.”
In 2015 such changes were outside the scope of his review, but Leveson’s current terms of reference now require him to consider reforms aimed at:
“… reducing demand on the Crown Court by retaining more cases in the lower courts.
This could include:
-
- The reclassification of offences from triable-either-way to summary only.
- Consideration of magistrates’ sentencing powers.
- The introduction of an Intermediate Court.
- Any other structural changes to the courts or changes to mode of trial that will ensure the most proportionate use of resources.”
There is much to be said about such changes but if you want to make a formal response to his consultation I’m afraid you are too late, though if you email independentreviewcriminalcourts@justice.gov.uk Lord Leveson may still consider what you say. His recommendations for what the government calls “long term reform” are expected by late spring.
However, the identity of the reviewer and the terms of reference themselves, leave little room for doubt about what those recommendations are expected to be.
It is all but inevitable that they will include curtailing, and possibly even abolishing, the right to trial by jury for “either-way” offences: that is, offences where, at present, either the Defence or the Magistrates themselves can insist on trial by jury. The proposed “intermediate” court will probably consist of a judge and two magistrates, with jurisdiction to pass sentences up to 2 years imprisonment.
Money is very tight and trial by jury is very expensive. An intermediate court would probably be cheaper and quicker than trial by jury, although the need to have a fair and effective appeal procedure for such cases may mean the savings are less than anticipated. But whatever benefits it might bring to the exchequer, such a change will not do anything to improve justice. Without wishing to denigrate magistrates, some of whom are of a high calibre, virtually no practitioners with experience of both the Magistrates and Crown Courts would consider that trial by magistrate is fairer than trial by jury.
That said, I am no longer convinced that trial by jury is always the best way to decide serious criminal cases.
It is good to involve ordinary members of the public in the criminal process, and the jury system does (on the whole) still retain public confidence: a 2024 You Gov poll found that 63% of those asked had either “a fair amount” or “a great deal” of trust in the jury system. Public confidence in the judiciary has been consistently much lower (around 43% had a fair amount or a great deal of trust in the judicial system according to another 2024 You Gov poll).
There is a respectable argument that a system that has evolved over the course of centuries will probably have many advantages over supposedly more rational innovations. Juries should certainly not be casually abandoned in the quest for efficiency.
There is also a disreputable argument that juries – by virtue of their ability to acquit “in accordance with their conscience” – are somehow indispensable guardians of our liberties: “the lamp that shows that freedom lives” to use Lord Devlin’s oft-quoted humbug. Oddly enough their equivalent ability to convict in defiance of both the law and the evidence is seldom mentioned.
If better justice, rather than “reducing demand on the Crown Court” were the objective of a review then perhaps Leveson would start by looking at more serious, indictable only, offences. Either-way offences tend – on the whole – to be relatively simple to decide. Was that punch reasonable self-defence? Was that behaviour “dishonest” according to the standards of right-thinking people? Was that driving far below the standard of an ordinary prudent motorist? Such questions do not have “objectively” right answers, they are matters of opinion upon which different people will often have differing views and those of 10 or 12 people are likely to be a far better reflection of society’s values than those of a single judge, or a couple of magistrates. If there is a good case for juries it is in deciding questions such as these. Similar considerations apply to some sexual cases where the issue is whether a complainant consented, or whether the defendant’s belief in consent was “reasonable.”
Where guilt depends on determining purely objective facts, and particularly where it depends on interpreting expert evidence, the case for juries is far weaker.
In his 2015 Review Leveson did, in fact, touch on the point:
“Juries cannot and should not be expected to understand and interpret complex scientific concepts. This is important for several reasons, but certainly in order to avoid unnecessary use of limited court resources, and in order to prevent juries reaching perverse decisions which might contribute to a loss of confidence not only in specific scientific areas but more fundamentally in the system of trial by jury.”
In the next paragraph he seemed to contradict himself:
“This is not to say that opposing scientific views should not be placed before the jury. Instead, this should be restricted to only those circumstances where it genuinely is an issue, and efforts made to minimise the number of contentious scientific questions in relation to which a jury is asked to make a decision.”
It was “rare” Leveson wrote, “to have a case where a large part of the complex technical or scientific evidence is not common ground.” He went on to make various suggestions for procedural tinkering, which have led, at best, to very modest reforms in the way expert evidence is presented in criminal cases.
And reforms aimed at improving the standard of expert evidence – important though they may be – miss the more fundamental point that Leveson himself identified.
If juries “cannot and should not be expected to understand” complex scientific concepts, then a jury trial in which the outcome depends on such understanding can hardly be anything but unfair. What is the point of putting scientific views before a jury which cannot understand them? I agree with Leveson that cases turning on contentious scientific evidence are not particularly common, but it is cold comfort for an innocent defendant facing a serious charge – mass murder, say – to be told “Sadly the jury won’t be able to understand the critical evidence in your case, but don’t worry, Lord Leveson thinks that doesn’t happen very often. Try not to look shifty in the witness box and you may still have a chance.”
Whether it happens rarely or not, the idea that 12 randomly selected people should ever be required to decide anyone’s guilt, and especially the guilt of someone charged with the most serious offences, on the basis of evidence that they don’t understand is nonsensical. Verdicts in such cases must instead be reached either by misunderstanding the science, or by ignoring it and concentrating on evidence that jurors can follow, or by ignoring the evidence altogether. However it is done the result can only be a travesty of justice. Trial by combat was fairer, but that was abolished in 1819.
Juries are routinely warned not to let their own emotions affect their verdicts. They are also generally given a direction (recommended in the Crown Court Compendium, an authoritative guide for trial judges) that:
“The presence or absence of emotion or distress when giving evidence does not provide a reliable indication of whether the person is telling the truth or not.”
But do juries take much notice of such directions? Who knows, but I’m afraid advocates, in the heat of a trial, may still be tempted to invite juries to assess witnesses, including defendants, on “the presence or absence of emotion.” Thus, for example, Nick Johnson KC’s very first question to Lucy Letby in his cross-examination at her first trial was:
“Is there any reason that you cry when you talk about yourself, but you don’t cry when talking about these dead and seriously injured children?”
If the science is all a bit hard to follow, how much easier to judge a case on whether the defendant cries appropriately during their evidence.
The time has come to ask if jury trial is ever fair for cases which depend to a significant extent on disputed expert evidence. At the very least, defendants should be entitled, as they are in most other common law jurisdictions, to ask for a trial by judge alone.
This is not because all judges are necessarily able to understand complex scientific evidence any better than jurors. Some will not, and some jurors might be brilliant scientists. And judges are anything but infallible. They will have their own prejudices. They may themselves misunderstand or misinterpret complex evidence, and they will certainly make mistakes, just as juries do. But at least a judge’s decision, unlike that of a jury, must be explained in a reasoned and public judgment which can then be challenged on appeal. A misunderstanding of the evidence will then have a higher chance of being noticed and corrected.
Part of the problem for anyone trying to appeal a wrongful conviction – at any rate in England and Wales – is the almost mystical obeisance paid by the Court of Appeal to a jury’s verdict. No matter that the verdict may be surprising or seemingly against the weight of the evidence; no matter that it might be based on evidence that the jury cannot be expected to have understood or critiqued. In the absence of admissible fresh evidence the Court of Appeal will not interfere unless there has been some error in the trial process. Thanks in part to Leveson’s 2015 review juries are now routinely given written legal directions and usually provided with a series of questions providing a “route to verdict.” But a correctly directed jury which has heard admissible evidence is still free to reach its verdicts in any way it sees fit.
Even when some part of the evidence given at trial becomes discredited after conviction the Court of Appeal may, and quite often does, decide that the discredited evidence was in fact of peripheral importance. That is so even though nobody is allowed to know what evidence or arguments in fact swayed the jury. Indeed, the Court of Appeal acknowledged (in a capital case, Armstrong (1922) 16 Cr.App.R. 149 at 159) as long ago as 1922 that knowing how jurors reached their decision might greatly undermine the whole edifice of jury trial:
“It may be that some jurymen are not aware that the inestimable value of their verdict is created only by its unanimity, and does not depend upon the process by which they believe that they arrived at it. … If one juryman might communicate with the public upon the evidence and the verdict, so might his colleagues also; and, if they all took this dangerous course, differences of individual opinion might be made manifest, which, at the least, could not fail to diminish the confidence that the public rightly has in the general propriety of criminal verdicts.”
It is an extraordinary justification of trial by jury: it matters not how the verdict has been reached, what matters is simply that it was unanimous; and individual jurors should keep their mouths shut. That was 1922, (and Armstrong was hanged without pursuing the point any further), but the position is in some ways even worse today. Verdicts are no longer unanimous and jurors who reveal the secrets of the jury room are likely to be committing a criminal offence.
Since the jury will have given no reasons for its verdict, and individual jurors will face punishment if they reveal what those reasons were, the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the significance the jury attached to discredited evidence may well be wrong. A reasoned judgment would demonstrate where and to what extent a judge had relied upon unreliable, discredited or simply misunderstood evidence.
In 2012 the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, gave a lecture in which he explained the importance of judges giving proper reasons for their decisions:
“Judgments are the means through which the judges address the litigants and the public at large, and explain their reasons for reaching their conclusions. Judges are required to exercise judgement – and it is clear that without such judgement we would not have a justice system worthy of the name – and they give their individual judgement expression through their Judgments. Without judgement there would be no justice. And without Judgments there would be no justice, because decisions without reasons are certainly not justice: indeed, they are scarcely decisions at all.”
If Lord Neuberger was correct that “decisions without reasons are certainly not justice,” it follows that decisions by juries, which never give reasons, are not justice.
As a criminal lawyer the Family Division is an alien environment. But many family cases require judges to decide what are essentially criminal allegations, for example of child abuse, albeit applying a lower standard of proof than in the criminal courts. The system is far from perfect, but I have repeatedly been struck by the comparative willingness of the Court of Appeal to overturn the decisions of the family courts, particularly when it feels that first instance judges have given flawed or inadequate judgments.
A single example will have to suffice: Re T [2023] EWCA Civ 757, in which, after a 10 day trial, an experienced and well-respected family court judge made findings that a girl, T, had been sexually abused some years earlier. The parties had to wait 4 months after making their final submissions for the judge to announce his decision, which was given orally and took around one hour to deliver. He found the central allegation of rape proven. The alleged perpetrator (“S”) and T’s mother appealed. The Court of Appeal overturned the judge’s findings and was highly critical of the judgment:
“I agree with the appellants’ submissions that the omissions from the judgment are extensive and significant, in particular the absence of any analysis of the ABE interview, or any assessment of credibility and reliability, or any detailed analysis of the appellants’ evidence, or the evidence of the safeguarding lead, or any reference to Dr Mohammed’s report, or any real consideration of the detailed submissions made on behalf of the parties. There was some analysis of the reliability of T’s allegations, but given the omissions in the judgment it was inevitably incomplete. The analysis of the evidence was manifestly insufficient, with crucial aspects of it not mentioned at all, and the judge’s explanation for his findings was perfunctory. The assertion in the judgment that S’s case was a bare denial completely failed to do justice to the nuanced evidence he gave both in four statements and nearly a day of oral evidence, and the lengthy submissions filed on his behalf. Anyone reading the judgment – be it the parties, the public, an appellate court, professionals working with the family, or in later years the children themselves – would have no idea how the judge assessed the complex evidence he heard, why he preferred some parts of the complex and contradictory evidence and rejected others, or why he reached his conclusions on the very serious – life-changing – allegations.”
The original judge had in fact explained, at considerable length, why he reached his decision. Yet the case was sent back to the lower court to be resolved by a different judge, because the original judgment was both flawed and “perfunctory.”
Contrast that with what would have happened if the same case were heard by a jury. Nobody would know what mistakes the jury had made. Assuming its reasoning was perfunctory, or worse, nobody would be any the wiser. The defendant would be expected to take one for the team, accepting perhaps a lengthy term of imprisonment. Perhaps a whole life term.
The recent rape case of Kahn Abdul [2023] EWCA Crim 1477 illustrates the point. During the jury’s deliberations one juror contacted the judge to complain that the other jurors appeared to be judging the defendant by the colour of his skin. She wrote a note to the judge:
“I don’t feel that the trial has been fair to Mr Khan because it seems the jury has racially profiled him without even considering the evidence. I have not felt comfortable for the last two days at all, from the moment we went into initial deliberation. All other 11 members within 15 minutes had made a decision. This did not sit right with me, nor did it did it make sense a two-week trial led to a 15-minutes decision.”
The judge decided to ask the other jurors if they felt able to decide the case on the evidence without racial bias. To nobody’s great surprise they all said that they did. Thus reassured, the judge allowed the trial to continue. The juror who had complained eventually asked to be excused, saying “please excuse me, I simply can’t do it no more,” and once she was discharged the remaining 11 jurors quickly returned a unanimous guilty verdict.
After the trial the juror who had complained and been discharged wrote to the Crown Court giving more details about what had happened:
“… early in the trial I heard a few jury members talking as we were leaving court and overheard them say “it’s the same kind”, “they should all be deported, it would be easier” following this comment they laughed and giggled and I was left speechless with my head hanged down. After hearing these words and the trial resuming, I was left disgusted but not sure what to do as we were not allowed to discuss the case. What shocked me even more was that before we even got into deliberation the case was being discussed by the others in the jury, making passive remarks on a daily basis. They were discussing openly and they are going to give a guilty verdict for Mr Khan which I thought was very unjust. I did not speak to anyone about this as I did not know what to do as we are under oath.
“On the 12th April 2023 we went into deliberation and within 15 minutes the jury found Mr Khan guilty. There was a lot of pressure from certain jury members who were stronger and I felt like others just felt forced to follow suit. I was the only person who said I did not agree with the decision I was being forcefully persuaded by other more stronger members very aggressively….in my opinion he [the defendant] deserved another trial on the basis that all the evidence was not considered and that the judge/jury was biased & racist & that it wasn’t fair.”
The Court of Appeal simply shrugged its collective shoulder and declared that the convictions were safe. It was not that they did not believe the juror who complained: they simply saw no need to investigate what had happened at all. In a paragraph of astonishing complacency William Davis LJ explained why not:
“The high point of the juror’s allegations of racial bias was her overhearing members of the jury making comments that appeared to have a racial connotation as they were leaving court at an early stage of the trial. Whether these comments were directed at the applicant in particular or were merely more generally derogatory is impossible to say. The juror’s letter does not allege any further reference to race. She speaks of jurors discussing what the verdict would be prior to their retirement. She refers to some jury members being stronger in character than others who placed pressure on other members of the jury. Her core complaint – just as in the note she sent on the morning of 13 April – was that the other members of the jury reached a verdict very quickly in a case where she thought that there was some merit in the defence. This does not require any further investigation by the CCRC. The letter does not provide any basis for a conclusion that the jurors who convicted the applicant were or might have been biased.”
He cited an earlier case with approval:
“… it is a necessary and integral part of the jury system that the deliberations of a jury must remain confidential. Without that general rule, the jury system would be seriously undermined. Those summoned to perform jury service would do so in a state of constant anxiety as to whether anything said during their deliberations would, without more, become the subject of speculation and perhaps investigation.”
It didn’t matter that a defendant called “Kahn Abdul” was tried by a jury full of racists, some of whom had (jokingly?) suggested that “they should all be deported,” who had made up their mind to convict at the start of the trial.
So it seems that a necessary and integral part of the jury system is that nobody should know if the jury doesn’t understand the evidence, and nobody should know that, in a racially charged case, the jury contains a number of racists. The jury has an inalienable right to convict accordance with its prejudices.
If it really is “a necessary and integral part of the jury system” that a verdict returned by a racist jury should be allowed to stand; or that a verdict returned by a jury that hasn’t understood the scientific evidence should, by some legal fiction, be considered safe, then perhaps it is time that we asked ourselves some more fundamental questions about the role of juries in the criminal justice system.
Many good points.
One obvious issue is despite the role of the Jury the Home Office / Ministry of Justice refuses to allow any research to be done into Juries and how they reach there verdict.
Secondly the issue in the Lethby trial seems to be ‘statistics’ something that many of those taking part will not be aware of. Do we need some sort of external scientific assessor(s) who can examine the evidence and provide explanations and opinions to the court but who are not there for the defence or prosecution but to help uncover the truth?
Yes, 2 good points. There has been some limited research on real juries, notably by Prof Cheryl Thomas. As far as she could tell juries weren’t unfair (the picture is a bit more nuanced obviously). But there is a lit more research that could be done and the law makes it very difficult.
On your second point, I’m a fan of an adversarial system because the court appointed expert is just as likely to be wrong. But an adversarial system is only fair if in practice both sides are equally resourced.
Why is a court appointed expert just as likely to be wrong ? If he is applying the scientific method then his hypothesis will be tested in the usual way.
A court appointed expert is being paid to say what the Court wants to hear. Such experts have sometimes found to be ludicrously supportive of a prosecution. I remember one saying the bullet hole indicated a gun in a sock was being thrown when a key witness said it was not. Not to mention a gun in a sock, whilst flying through the air, has never been known to offer any aggression.
I would add that I have appeared in front of some judges who were just plain thick . .
In my own very limited experience, a jury can be perverse in its ability to ignore evidence or its absence, and even to almost invent evidence and form an opinion on that invention.
I have been a jury member. We convicted two out of three defendants. Despkte the fact that I was the only member taking notes during the trial, and extensive ones, to my shame I failed to point out the flaws in the jury’s decision. One member was also blatantly racist. If I’m ever on a jury again, I hope I will be more able to stick to my guns.
To address the Barrister’s points, though: another example might be cases of financial crime, where both the operation of the financial instruments concerned are so complex, and the means of defraruding them even more so, it seems rather obvious that a jury inevitably composed almost or totally of lay people will have great difficulty understanding what can be done within the law, and what goes beyond it.
I think juries are a complete waste of time when technical evidence is presented. The Lethby and Sally Clark cases are examples. I will put it bluntly, which is that 50% of the population is below average IQ . . this is a brute fact . Sorry if this comprises hurty words . .but it is true . .Persons with IQs of 80 and below are rejected by the US forces (according to Jordan Peterson) because they cannot carry out basic tasks . .Yet they can sit on a jury ?
In my experience Juries are suspiciously loaded with those linked to the establishment. Now whether they have an above average person’s intelligence can be debated. I have also witnessed the partners of Police Officer’s appear on Juries. In one case they would have known the Judge had lied about the work status of a Police Officer who’d left the Force 5 months before the Court was told he was off work sick. When brought to the attention of the Police, CPS and Courts this was ignored. So there can only be one conclusion that when corruption is plainly taking place within a Courtroom a Jury can easily be influenced by a planted Juror who seconds the Judge’s advice as if it is truthful.
Another excellent article, Matthew.
My first draft of a comment was another blog post! So here’s a summary:
Re the obeisance towards jury verdicts, both A 1964 Justice Committee and the 1993 Runciman (Royal) Commission have strongly suggested that the Court of Appeal should be less deferential to Jury verdicts.
The latter also rejected the requirement for fresh evidence and suggested that Appeal judges read the trial transcript.
You make several excellent points about why juries should give reasons – for me, it’s a no-brainer; they most definitely should, especially in majority verdicts, but…
Majority verdicts should be stopped. There are a number of reasons for this explained in the document Doubt dismissed: race, juries and wrongful conviction by Naïma Sakande and Nisha Waller
“Try not to look shifty in the witness box and you may still have a chance.” Love that!
Having been a juror, I feel for the letter writing lady. I was in a similar position, with the other jurors ignoring evidence and direction from the judge because of their prejudice. At one point during our deliberations, which went on because I wasn’t budging, the judge had us return to the court so he could explain to us how he wanted us to proceed. On returning to the jury room it became clear to me the judge’s clarification had gone over their heads.
But I was able to talk them round eventually; and the right verdict was given. Had I not been able to persuade them I guess I would have asked to be removed too.
We had scientific expertise presented and most of the jury did not understand it. They weren’t bright enough. I had to re-explain everything that had been said in words they would understand. Fortunately I took copious notes. No one else did.
Had I not been there and taken role of foreman, the wrong verdict would have happened. The judge and both sides’ barristers would have been mystified as to why.
Maybe we need an IQ test to be a juror.
Perhaps the answer to the question of juries or judge is to appoint you, all knowing one.
One does not need to be “all knowing”, but an IQ higher than your average flatfish would be an advantage . .
All knowing aye? I am not convinced we have debated enough for you to praise me yet. Although I limit my knowledge to that which I have concrete evidence of. That perhaps is why few ever question what I say only going as far to be sarcastic which reveals they themselves might be a less effective Juror than they think.
I agree . . .even with the best will in the world . . there is little point in presenting scientific evidence to your less than brilliant moppet in the street . .
Some Jurors are expert in the topics discussed but their knowledge has to have accreditation. I once said that fitness to be interviewed has been abused extensively when necessary but I was forbidden to speak any further on the topic by the Judge. I was just stating that there was no test in hospitals for concussion only a presumption of potential unfitness to be questioned. Many people injured with concussion were likely to be unable to recall fully or make a decision on whether to have representation. Even tests for calcium leakage in the blood or breath can diminish within minutes. How would a Juror react to this or would they be steered by a Judge whose own knowledge on concussion was likely to be questionable?
The title of this article should be
“Are barristers fair my learned bellend??”
Let us all pander to Lord Neuberger from the bent Blacksone Chambers shall we?
Lord whatever must be correct as he has vast lived experience of injustice and social ranking from Lord Jesus- violins “decisions without reasons are certainly not justice,” it follows that decisions by juries are not justice.
No justice- implies justice actually exists.
We all know that if juries are scrapped, which is going to happen thanks to honourable Lords passion for fairness, thus the “barrister bloggers” bias article (doing a good days work)- will not improve anything. If anything it might just show what a total farce this whole system is in the first place.
A judge without bias?? I would die of shock.
Actually no juries would be fab, Especially if corrupt barristers are left to their own devices with zero oversight.
The cashflow nightmare/scarcity argument is also bs, given the vast amount of money poured into the justice system and the LCIA. Funnelled off shore …with help by “fair” barristers with frou frou titles.
It’s not news to anyone that jury members – or even a majority of a jury – may deliberate hastily, carelessly, ignorantly or in prejudiced terms. At least, it’s not news to anyone who’s seen the film Twelve Angry Men (1957). Majority verdicts make these abuses much more likely to result in a perverse verdict rather than a hung jury – which suggests that the fault may not lie with the jury system but with a reform designed to deliver jury verdicts quicker and cheaper.
The Abdul case is shocking, but more for the complacency of the Appeal Court and the dereliction of duty of the judge at first instance. You’ve been over this ground before, Matthew, in reference to the Trudi Warner case; at the time I posted a lengthy analysis on my blog, from which I’ll just quote the following thought-experiment:
Suppose that Judge Able is told by a spokesperson for the jury in her case that they intend to decide the case as a pure matter of conscience, as is their right. Later that day, Judge Baker bumps into a member of the jury in his case, who mentions that they haven’t really been paying attention but intend to acquit because the defendant “seems nice”. Two similar cases had concluded the previous day; by an extraordinary coincidence, Judge Clarence’s jury had also decided their case as a matter of conscience, while Judge Darrow’s jury had also based its decision on the defendant’s appearance. The difference between them and juries A and B is that juries C and D gave their verdict without having let the judge know what they’d been up to.
On these rather contrived facts, it seems to me that, firstly, there’s no significant difference between juries C and D, both of whom can go home and get on with their lives. “A jury is entitled to acquit and its reasons for so doing are unknown”; their verdicts stand and can’t now be overturned, and they will face no consequences for their unorthodox decision processes.
…
But, while there’s no difference between juries C and D, there is a significant difference between juries A and B, both of whom are (at the time of this thought-experiment) still in the process of deciding their case. Now that their – plainly defective and disrespectful – approach to the case has come to light, the members of jury B are liable to be discharged for abusing their position; jury A, on the other hand, hasn’t merited any more in the way of discipline than a restatement of the judge’s directions, probably followed by a resigned sigh.
Just as Jury A has, and C had, the [Hohfeldian] power to decide the case on conscience, jury B has, and D had, the power to decide the case on frivolous grounds. The difference between juries A and B is that jury A has immunity to having that decision overruled, whereas jury B doesn’t – and neither would jury D have done, if what they did had become known
The judge in this case was Judge C; he or she should have halted the trial and made further enquiries. Asking the jury outright whether they were racist is hopelessly inadequate.
In short, what you’ve described here is an abuse of the system, not a defect in it. I hope Lord Leveson decides wisely, although to my mind that doesn’t currently seem likely.
So a judge not only bumps into a juror but discusses the case with him ? Not exactly realistic is it ? Have you ever been involved in a court case . .Phew !!!
Juries can be manipulated especially when the Judge is trying to protect several corrupt Police Officers or witnesses. Freemasonry is still the biggest elephant in the room as no one in the Court is likely to be aware of a conflict of interest when a Police Officer, Freemason expert witness or medical Freemason are giving evidence. Within the known and proven miscarriages of justice there will have been thousands of corrupt Police Officers and many suspicious experts involved with many being Freemasons. Very few will have been charged with corrupt activities. Judges are heavily involved in these crimes being covered up and that will have involved those married or connected to Freemasonry. The tolerance of Freemasonry by non-Masons has created many of these issues.
And your empirical objective evidence for this is what . . .???
I discovered the now retired Judge [name edited] had forged Trial Transcripts to conceal his conspiracy with Prosecution counsel. This for having lied to the Jury over numerous issues to heighten the guilt of the accused. 3 very senior Appeal Application Judges claimed Hetherington had done nothing wrong. These Judges, as was [name edited], were closely connected to Freemasonry. With regards the several thousand Police Officers who were protected from Prosecution for having corrupted Trials which case would you like as an example of non-prosecution? Not accepting The case involving Andrew Mitchell MP who saw a Police Officer change his witness evidence to one of claiming “I dreamt the whole matter”. He was jailed more for having performed badly as a liar as much as anything else. PS I have full paperwork to substantiate everything I say. [Edited to avoid libel. Matthew]
I understand and this is your valuable platform Mathew. I feel however that libeling me would be unwise, hence my numerous occasions of naming of corrupt Freemason Judges, drawing no actions whatsoever. My evidence and claims are irrefutable.
I did say empirical objective evidence . . I am not sure that this anecdote really works to demonstrate a significant probability that the whole system is corrupt . .Therein lies the problem in relation to statistical analysis in a nutshell . ..Technically this is known as an “induction dilemma” . . How a jury could distinguish between that data which shows a high probability of being right and that which does not is in the lap of the gods…
I never said the whole system is corrupt. The large number of Freemason Judges who sought to cover this matter up confirms that miscarriages of Justice are prevented from gaining traction because the Justice system will not support accountability amongst it’s members. A further issue is that Juries can easily be loaded with Jurors likely to convict. The modern age of Police Officers and their partners appearing as undetected, on juries where Prosecution Corruption is widespread, has been witnessed by myself. Once this is reported it is ignored. More so in matters where a Judge is prepared to forge the very sections in a Trial Transcription that will be checked by the Royal Court of Appeal. Prosecution likely Jurors have been used for years as have tactics to bore and steer Juries. A complete overhaul of the Justice System is necessary to remove the gravy train aspect of the law that even the very best of Barristers benefit from.
How many freemason judges are we talking about ? What is the source of your information ?
If we lose trial by jury can we please restore some democratic legitimacy by reforming the judicial appointments process?
The theatre of appointments to the SCOTUS will of course be cited as a knock-down argument against reform. But set against that the perceived activism of recent years from judges who come across as remarkably lacking in diversity of thought.
Democratic legitimacy is not an option I’m afraid.
Plutocracy’s do not offer such hogwash.
Yours is the polite way of putting it . .I prefer “thick judges” and “thicker juries” . .
True!
“some cases simply do not merit the more elaborate, costly and time-consuming procedures of the Crown Court.” A rational man would ask how the costs and time might be reduced.
Anyway, my reservations about juries begin to pale compared to my reservations about barristers and judges. Lucy Letby smells of Sally Clark all over again – innumerate chumps staff our courts it would seem.
Not only do judges qua judges look increasingly dismal but judges as chairmen of public inquiries seem even worse. Can one really get so far in legal life without showing a spark of critical intelligence? Or are they simply bent? God save us all.
Everything is so costly in our broke court system which has built a legal system and an epicentre for money laundering mammoth amounts offshore. With zero oversight. Why keep juries? Who can afford such an expense?
One must seriously struggle with cashflow nightmares.
Alas! the Sally Clark case that allowed expert forensic practitioners and compromised lawyers to do what they do best, misuse statistics to mislead the jury. Not much has changed today.
Only today we have the audacity to blame most juries of possessing a low IQ – as if the professionals deciding and defending a case are superior in moral ethics.
Instead of scrapping juries why not scrap the whole system and hand everything over to AI.
Unemployed is the new fair my learned friend!
Not only low IQs but patent bias . . AI seems a better option . .
Correct, bent includes hiding behind fake profiles.
Bent also includes lying, ripping off clients to the sum of 80k, whilst hiding behind the Bar and a veneer of respectability. Apologies to bruise your ego…
AI is a cost effective way to remove the corrupt practices and redistributed the imbalances of power. Perhaps the public could vote?
Would it be a tall order for the law blogs to take a break from bootlicking to maybe drafting relevant articles once in a while?
The veneer is slipping.
I have confirmation of many Judges being bent!
The Letby case verdict looks very unsafe. We could do with a panel of neutral experts away from the court who come to a view. That opinion could then be used and tested in court. Apparently the main prosecution expert put himself forward to the police / CPS, and said “he had rarely lost a case”. 20+ years after the scandal involving the expert Roy Meadow we are here again in a similar situation.
I used to work in IT but more than 20 years ago. I suppose I could have been used in the cases involving the sub-postmasters, but being so out of date and using me as an expert witness would be very concerning. The same applies to the main prosecution witness in the Letby case who had retired 8 years earlier.
I found it incredible that the court accepted in the cases involving the sub-postmasters that “the computer system could not be wrong”. Anyone involved with IT knows computer systems do make errors, usually because of programming mistakes, inadequate testing or occasionally hardware issues.
Someone when talking about the Letby case referred to the French Dreyfus case, where Dreyfus was banged up because the establishment did not want to confront it’s own failings or potential corruption. It was easier and more convenient to keep an innocent person in prison.
“AI seems a better option”
AI just regurgitates what it’s found on the internet, but with added hallucinations. Rather like a journalist, I suppose, or a judge.
I’d say we should try to improve the jury system, rather than thinking trial by judge alone is going to be any better.
On expert evidence, if experts disagree about some crucial point, can the case really be said to be proven beyond reasonable doubt? There have been a number of cases where expert evidence has been presented that has subsequently been questioned by other experts. We need better training for lawyers and judges, and tighter rules, on the use of expert evidence, and what conclusions can and (very importantly) cannot be drawn from it.
On the matter of emotion, much research has shown that the idea that one can assess credibility based on emotional responses is bunk. The civil courts are coming round to the view that witness evidence is often unreliable, and cases should be decided on objective facts. Again, better training and rules are required. Nick Johnson’s question to Lucy Letby shouldn’t have been allowed.
Finally, if revealing the process by which juries arrive at their verdicts would bring the entire justice system crashing down, how come they seem to manage in the USA with no such restrictions? The rules seem to be about “maintaining confidence in the system” in the sense of “not letting the public know when we’ve screwed up”. Fairly typical of an establishment that treats the general public like children.
I have witnessed a Judge having forged and depleted Trial Transcripts. I have documents to confirm a government appointed Barrister disregarded these significant falsifications of over 20 or so transcript pages. The same Judge saw to it that a Court recorder told the defence team of the Trial not starting until after lunch but it resumed within minutes of the defence leaving the building. The Judge also told the Jury that a ruling meant the Prosecution did not have to provide a closing speech. This was an open lie to the Court. This same Judge refused a witness statement entry into the Trial because the Police had not taken the statement. The statement, a third from a witness, suggested her two earlier statements had been forged by Police Officers. This has since been proven. A number of Appeal Court Judges openly declared the Judge, who’d lied about an Officer (one of the forgers) being off sick when having left the force 5 months earlier, had done nothing wrong. They decided upon this when using the forged transcripts. Mason or non Mason Judges replacing Juries in Criminal cases? I think not. The thousands of Police Officers, many clearly Freemasons, who convicted innocent people by failing to disclose of tell the truth, would suggest that Judges and the Police are the biggest cause of corruption in our Courts not the Jury. Included in this corruption are Juries loaded with suspiciously inappropriate people.
Good points! The Freemason issue still needs to be addressed. We cannot wait for Freemason numbers to disappear over the next decade or so to prevent miscarriages of Justice. Some Doctors and Journalists become Freemasons to afford themselves extra protection or access to jobs and involvement with critical events. How many so called expert witnesses are Freemasons following a Prosecution line of accusation? The Elephant in room is not being addressed in this interesting debate.
Nothing will change from the inside. Freemasonry and the reluctance to address dubious practices is why bent judges and others in positions of “power” are no longer trusted. Corruption.
The irony is it will lead to total anarchy once all of the lies become exposed.
We are seeing that today…
The problem with better training for lawyers is the sheer diversity of technical subjects which would need to be mastered . .